I am one of those who believe that the war launched at Kabamba on February 6 (Tarehe Sita), 1981, which brought the National Resistance Army/ Movement (NRA/M) to power in 1986, could have taken a different course.

Even as the five-year duration then famously set a record on the African continent, with the rebels having no rear base in another country, the war could have been over in a much shorter time.

Why did the fighters have to take a very long detour from the city suburb of Makindye, through Masaka and on to the Luweero triangle via Kabamba, instead of heading straight for the power centres in the city of Kampala and overrunning the establishment?

My estimate is that the UNLA forces would have been taken by surprise and overwhelmed by such a move, due to the surprise element, recalling that after 36-year-old Yoweri Museveni vowed to take up arms in case of a rigged 1980 election, he was taken for a bluffing fool.

Nevertheless, the ‘shortcut’ move could have been best employed, not in 1981, but around three years later, when the Obote II government had completely written off all threats by Museveni as the decadent bluff and rants of an idle mind.

CONFIDENT OBOTE

I say this because by 1981, pro-Museveni elements were scarce. After working clandestinely to build an army within UNLA that was loyal to the cause of the NRA/NRM, the Luweero jungles could have been avoided.

They then would have struck out and overrun their objectives without much of the blood and bones.

I suppose the Obote commanders must have taken the attack on Kabamba and other forays by the NRA in outlying nooks as cowardly acts of sour losers whom Obote dismissively referred to as “bandits” or “gunmen.” He was confident that they wouldn’t last. He totally rejected the idea of dialoguing with them.

PAUL MUWANGA

Employing guerilla tactics, the rebels confused the UNLA which would have stood better chances in a direct (conventional) confrontation. ‘Hit and run’ means the attacker sets the place and time of battle, which gave NRA an advantage to counterbalance the lack of armaments.

There were times of lulls in the fighting, for various reasons, such as when a particularly-costly battle had occurred, or when the leadership felt the guerilla army should lie low and replenish.

If the fighting had been continuous, it would probably have lasted a year or two, and the narrative would have been quite different. Around 1984, there was an opportunity to end the conflict through a negotiated settlement with the Obote government.

Vice President Paulo Muwanga, who was also the minister of defence, had made contact with the NRA rebels and wanted to talk peace with them. He had a game plan of contesting for the UPC leadership against his boss, Milton Obote, and thought brokering peace with the rebel groups that were making life difficult for the regime would bolster his stature. It is said Obote was opposed to such an arrangement, but Muwanga went on with it, anyway.

DIFFERENT STORY

In the NRA camp, the idea of dialogue was welcomed by some commanders while others disagreed. Rebel leader Museveni was reportedly apprehensive and suspicious, based on his insider knowledge of Muwanga, whom he had deputized in the military commission.

NRA was later to lose a senior commander, Sam Katabarwa, to this botched attempt at dialogue with the government when he was kidnapped in Wandegeya and murdered by Obote loyalists opposed to compromise with the rebels. It is said Muwanga had plotted to murder Museveni in case he agreed to join government.

That glitch, and a later one with the Tito Okello junta which didn’t work after a peace deal was signed in Nairobi, meant that the Luweero pangs were needlessly prolonged.

Other struggles that lasted too long include the SPLA/M rebellion in Sudan, which lasted 13 years and still failed to take Khartoum ‒ just ending up in Juba. Kony waged war against the NRM government for 19 years but failed to capture and administer any territory before eventually being flushed out of Uganda. Similarly, the Rwanda Patriotic Army/Front (RPA/F) war shouldn’t have gone on for four years.

Rwanda is a small country!

Compare this with the huge Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) where Laurent Kabila’s forces overthrew Mobutu in a matter of months. But it all goes to show that there is no formula to armed conflict. Tactics, strategy, logistics and acts of nature are the determinants.

For example, what if Oyite Ojok hadn’t died (in a chopper crash in 1983) or Maj Oduka, Obote’s security chief, hadn’t died of cancer? Or what if the Okellos and President Nyerere of Tanzania hadn’t fallen out with Obote? Or what if Obote had adopted an open policy of talking to Museveni; wouldn’t the story be very different?

There is no report of defections, double dealing or betrayal on the rebel side with the government, but the opposite was true ‒ Tadeo Kanyankore, Julius Oketta, Jeje Odongo, Katumba Wamala, etc. NRA was lucky that all factors worked in its favour, on top of the conviction and experience of the commanders.

atuhairwe_robert@yahoo.com

The author is a member of the Commonwealth Writers Group.