
A few days ago, President Museveni named 13 persons for appointment as permanent secretaries (and clerk to parliament) and directed the Public Service Commission (PSC) merely to “assess their suitability.”
These are not personal staff posts of the President. Under Article 174(1) of the Constitution, the office of permanent secretary is a public office in a ministry or department of the government.
Article 174(2) requires that a permanent secretary “shall be appointed by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the PSC.”
The same principle applies under Article 172(1)(a) for senior public service positions of the rank of head of department and above, and under Article 87 for the clerk to parliament. The Constitution draws a clear distinction.
Article 172(2) creates a special rule only for offices on the personal staff of the President, where the President’s consent is required. Permanent Secretaries do not fall into that category.
Treating them as if they do by headhunting names in secret and then presenting the PSC with a pre-selected list for formal endorsement reduces the commission to a rubberstamp.
This violates the independence of the PSC guaranteed by Article 166(2). These appointments must be competitive and transparent. Secretive selection, followed by a directed “assessment,” excludes qualified Ugandans on grounds that have nothing to do with merit.
This breaches Article 21 (equality before the law and freedom from discrimination) and Article 38 (the right of every Ugandan to participate in the affairs of government).
UNDERMINING INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES
Three of the named posts are not offices in “a ministry or department of the Government of Uganda” within the meaning of Article 174.
Treating them as ordinary permanent secretary posts under Article 174 is a direct assault on the separation of powers and the constitutional independence of those institutions: For instance, Inspectorate of Government (IG) where Maureen Kasande was deployed as PS, is an independent constitutional body.
Article 227 provides that it “shall be independent in the performance of its functions and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority and shall only be responsible to Parliament.”
Its Secretary is provided for under the Inspectorate of Government Act on specific terms. At Public Service Commission where Betty Mutesa Cwinya-ai was deployed, the entity is itself an independent constitutional body under Articles 165 and 166.
Article 166(2) guarantees that it “shall be independent and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority.”
Under the Public Service Commission Act, its secretary is appointed by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the Commission itself. The same goes for the position of Clerk to Parliament, now held by Edward Sengonzi Damulira.
Parliament is an independent arm of government. Treating the Clerk as if the office were that of a Permanent Secretary of a ministry or department under Article 174, or a personal staff of the President under Article 172(2), and subjecting the appointment to the same executive-directed process, erodes the institutional independence of the Legislature and the separation of powers.
In all three cases, the President has misapplied Article 174 to offices that are deliberately insulated from ordinary executive control. This is not a technical error; it is a systemic expansion of executive dominance over independent constitutional institutions.
THE HARM TO UGANDA IS CONCRETE AND CUMULATIVE
When senior accounting officers and technical heads of ministries are chosen by connection rather than open competition, service delivery suffers. Public money is less likely to be spent efficiently or honestly.
Qualified professionals who lack the right political or family links are shut out, weakening the capacity of the state.
Public trust collapses when citizens see that the highest administrative posts are treated as personal rewards. The independence of the Public Service Commission is damaged, and with it the possibility of a professional, non-partisan civil service.
When the same methods reach independent constitutional bodies such as the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Inspectorate of Government, the Public Service Commission itself, and Parliament, the separation of powers is further eroded.
When the same methods reach the Judiciary, the last institutional check on executive power is also compromised. Over time, this produces a public service, a legislature, an accountability framework, and a judiciary that serve power rather than the people.
WHAT UGANDANS CAN DO
These appointments can and should be challenged. Citizens, public servants, civil society organisations, and lawyers may file a constitutional petition in the Constitutional Court under Article 137 or other proceedings in a competent court, challenging the process as inconsistent with Articles 21, 38, 87, 166, 172, 174, 223-227, and the principle of separation of powers.
The ULS stands ready to assist in the preparation and coordination of public interest litigation.
The author is President, Uganda Law Society.

