For over three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been Africa’s giant that bled but rarely bit back.
As Rwandan-backed rebels occupied its mineral-rich east, Kinshasa’s response was largely confined to signing peace agreements, from Lusaka in 1999 to Pretoria in 2002, Goma in 2008, and the Nairobi and Luanda tracks in 2022.
As DRC assumed the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council in July, a fundamental question hang over the Great Lakes region: Is Kinshasa finally embarking on a “Wolf’s Journey” shedding its skin as a victimized target to become an aggressive, strategic actor on the global diplomatic stage?
And for neighbours like Uganda and Rwanda, what does this new Congolese bite look like? To understand this shift in Congolese foreign policy, one must look past the battlefields of North and South Kivu and into the corridors of New York, where DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner recently articulated her country’s new doctrine.
“We have become so engrossed in our inner battles that getting to a consensus on a document has become the achievement,” Wagner told PassBlue media, delivering a stark critique of the UN Security Council.
“The Council’s mission is not to pass resolutions. Its job is to preserve international peace and security… You don’t get to sit there just because you have beautiful eyes.”
It is a striking statement from a nation that spent decades watching its sovereignty eroded. But this newfound assertiveness is not without its contradictions, especially when viewed through the historical lens of the Great Lakes region.
THE NZOGOLA THESIS: OUTMANEUVERING THE WEST
In his seminal work, From Zaire to Kabila: Africa’s Deep Crisis, Congolese academic and activist Georges Nzogola made a piercing observation: following the 1997 All-Zaire Political Conference, Western powers routinely recognized and supported foreign-backed strongmen while systematically undermining genuinely democratic, sovereign Congolese institutions.
For years, this dynamic played out across Kinshasa’s eastern border. Western powers routinely turned a blind eye to regional incursions, treating the DRC as an administrative pie to be carved up by warlords and foreign armies rather than a sovereign nation-state.
Is DRC’s current “Wolf’s Journey” at the UN an attempt to break this historical pattern? By taking Rwanda to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in June 2026, accusing Kigali of genocide, torture, and state-sponsored abuses, Kinshasa is bypassing the traditional diplomatic channels that Nzogola argued had failed them.
Instead of waiting for external powers to mediate, President Félix Tshisekedi’s government is weaponizing international law.
“You don’t get away with claiming that you will create peace… and then get away with the worst crimes being perpetrated,” Wagner warned, drawing a direct link between the ICJ lawsuit and regional security.
“Rwanda had its own justice process after the genocide… Why should this be denied to Congolese?”
THE GEOPOLITICS OF KAMPALA AND KIGALI
For a Ugandan audience, Kinshasa’s diplomatic offensive evokes an uncomfortable sense of déjà vu. Uganda’s own historical entanglements in eastern Congo, from the wars of the late 1990s to the pillaging documented by UN panels of experts, remain a sensitive chapter in bilateral relations.
Today, while Uganda maintains a military presence in eastern DRC under Operation Shujaa (targeting the Allied Democratic Forces), Rwanda finds itself increasingly isolated. The geopolitical calculus has shifted dramatically.
The 2025 Washington Accord, which called for Rwandan troop withdrawals alongside US-backed regional economic partnerships, lies in tatters. When M23 fighters captured Uvira shortly after the accord was signed, Washington reacted with unprecedented sanctions targeting the senior command of the Rwandan military.
Kampala is watching closely. Uganda has spent years attempting to balance its complex ties with Kigali against the economic imperative of a stable eastern Congo. But Kinshasa’s assertive foreign policy suggests the era of unpunished regional military incursions in the DRC is drawing to a close.
The DRC is no longer restricting its fight to the bush; it successfully lobbied the UN to adopt Resolution 2773, the first explicit Security Council document in two decades to directly name Rwanda as a party to the conflict.
If Kinshasa can orchestrate Kigali’s diplomatic and legal isolation, no neighbouring state can assume immunity from similar international litigation or trade sanctions.
PAPER PEACE VS. GROUND REALITY
Yet in the highlands of Minembwe and the coltan mining sites of Masisi, UN resolutions feel distant.
“Let them sign their papers in New York. Here, we are still burying our children,” says Jean-Pierre Mugaruka, a civil society leader from South Kivu, speaking via a crackling phone line.
“When drones fly over our villages, do they check if the UN has passed a resolution? The M23 is still here. Rwanda is still here. Our people remain displaced.”
Mugaruka’s frustration reflects the central dilemma Minister Wagner acknowledged: the massive divide between diplomatic achievements abroad and security on the ground. Internal ethnic narratives also remain deeply contested.
During her New York meetings, Wagner was forced to address demonstrations by Congolese diaspora groups outside UN headquarters, who accused Kinshasa of failing to protect minority Tutsi-Banyamulenge communities.
Critics contend these communities are trapped between hostile armed groups and state suspicion. Wagner rejected these allegations, framing the DRC as a multi-ethnic nation of over 600 groups where “everyone is a minority.”
She redirected the charge back toward Kigali: “They are held hostage by Rwandans who claim to protect them… The UN Group of Experts has established that the M23 and the Rwandan military are plundering natural resources. Do you think they enter villages to protect civilians? No, they are pursuing mines.”
THE WOLF’S DILEMMA
The DRC assuming the UN Security Council presidency carries deep historical irony. A nation long defined as the subject of endless, unenforced UN resolutions now presides over the body that drafted them.
However, the true test of this “Wolf’s Journey” will not be measured by Foreign Minister Wagner’s soundbites in New York. It depends on whether Kinshasa can leverage international sanctions and its ICJ case to deliver practical security for Mugaruka and millions of displaced civilians across the east.
In Uganda, the policy lesson is clear: the legacy framework of Great Lakes geopolitics, where regional military interventions in Congo proceeded without legal consequence, has collapsed.
The giant has not only asserted itself; it has learned to litigate and lobby on the international stage. As Kigali confronts this diplomatic pressure, Kampala must ensure its own regional security operations strictly respect Congolese sovereignty, avoiding the legal and political crosshairs of Kinshasa’s sharpened foreign policy.
The author is a regional affairs analyst