Overview:

The government once declared General Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s partisan activities unlawful. Yet the NRM is contemplating his presidential succession while he remains Chief of Defence Forces. Is Uganda drifting towards constitutional rule by exception in which political power overrides the Constitution?

CDF Muhoozi Kainerugaba

In January 2023, Dr Chris Baryomunsi, then minister of ICT and National Guidance, offered an unequivocal interpretation of the law governing General Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s political activities.

Appearing on NBS Television’s Frontline, Baryomunsi explained that Muhoozi was not a member of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). As a serving military officer, his partisan politicking was illegal and he should abandon it.

This was the Government Minister for National Guidance articulating what he described as the position of government and the NRM. I am unaware of any formal withdrawal of that interpretation or contrary government legal opinion.

Last Saturday, appearing on BBS Television’s Zimba Ensi Yo, moderated by Hon. Kaddu Mukasa, alongside Hon. James Kakooza, Hon. Simbwa and Advocate Jude Mbabaali, I articulated substantially the same legal position. My interpretation was not contested.

In hereditary monarchies, a regent preserves the throne for an heir who has not attained legal majority. Uganda’s succession debate presents an unusual variation: an adult military commander who cannot presently acquire the NRM membership necessary for presidential candidature. He is barred by law.

Is the NRM preparing for democratic succession or reserving its candidature for an anticipated heir awaiting legal eligibility?

The question gained urgency following the NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC) deliberations of 10 November 2026.

Conflicting accounts emerged. Some suggested senior members resisted Muhoozi’s proposed succession; others claimed endorsement. Secretary General Richard Todwong denied that CEC had rejected the proposal, indicating that official decisions would follow appropriate party channels.

But denying rejection is not confirmation of approval.

Whatever CEC resolved, can a political party effectively reserve its presidential candidature for a serving military commander presently prohibited from becoming its member?

THE LAW IS NOT AMBIGUOUS

Article 208(2) of Uganda’s Constitution requires the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) to remain non-partisan, professional, disciplined and subordinate to civilian authority.

Section 16(1) of the Political Parties and Organisations Act, 2005 prohibits serving UPDF personnel from founding, promoting or joining political parties; holding party office; publicly addressing partisan controversies; or canvassing for political parties and their candidates.

Section 16(2) makes contravention an offence punishable, upon conviction, by a fine not exceeding twenty-four currency points, imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

These are enforceable prohibitions, not ethical aspirations.

Section 97 of the UPDF Act, as amended, reinforces the requirement that military personnel seeking political office must first lawfully resign or retire.

The sequence is unmistakable: military service must end before pursuing political office.

Military status cannot be suspended for political rallies, restored for military command and suspended again for partisan mobilisation.

Military service is a continuing legal status, not a dress code.

Nor does describing the Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU) as a pressure group resolve the difficulty. Whatever its classification, a serving officer remains bound by Article 208(2). The decisive question is whether his activities constitute partisan mobilisation.

THE NRM’S OWN CONSTITUTION

Articles 8 and 9 of the NRM Constitution govern party membership and members’ participatory rights. Article 44(1) makes party membership and compliance with national legal requirements prerequisites for candidature.

Article 44(2)(a) provides that the party’s presidential candidate shall be elected by the National Conference from candidates recommended by the National Executive Council.

CEC cannot itself elect the NRM presidential candidate, much less confer eligibility upon a serving military officer prohibited by national law from acquiring party membership.

Admittedly, parties may discuss prospective leaders. Muhoozi could retire, acquire membership and compete in 2031. Section 16 does not prohibit every civilian expression of support for his possible future candidature.

But conditional political preference differs fundamentally from an operative endorsement purporting to confer candidate status upon someone presently ineligible.

Consider the Mwangaza African Revolutionary Study Groups, chaired by presidential aide David Mafabi under President Museveni’s patronage. Its reported 13 November declaration endorses Muhoozi’s succession while insisting on constitutional compliance. Yet political endorsement cannot confer membership, override statutory prohibitions or replace lawful nomination procedures.

Article 71(1)(c) of the national Constitution requires political parties to conform to democratic principles.

Existing NRM members have no automatic entitlement to nomination, but they are entitled to lawful procedures and meaningful competition.

Why should a prospective member, presently prohibited from joining, receive preferential treatment potentially foreclosing qualified competitors?

Whatever recent developments suggest, the NRM remains a political party, not a hereditary institution. Its presidential candidature is not a family estate awaiting transfer from father to son.

THE DANGER OF NORMALISING LAWLESSNESS

Constitutional government does not collapse only through formal repeal. It also deteriorates when institutions retain constitutional appearances while political practice disregards legal limitations.

Uganda’s experience illustrates the danger. Whatever our objections to the removal of presidential term limits in 2005 and age limits in 2017, those changes followed formal constitutional amendments.

Today’s controversy is different: can binding constitutional and statutory restrictions simply be disregarded without amendment, authoritative judicial interpretation or other lawful justification?

When a serving military commander undertakes partisan mobilisation while the governing party looks on and contemplates his candidature, the issue transcends individual ambition.

It concerns whether constitutional limitations still bind those exercising state power.

WHEN MILITARY POWER ENTERS CIVILIAN POLITICS

The consequences extend beyond presidential succession.

In recent statements reportedly made on X, Muhoozi demanded that Vice President Jessica Alupo relinquish office to him and threatened her with arrest over alleged connections with retired General Peter Elwelu.

If accurately reported, such threats by a serving military commander against the Vice President evoke disturbing memories of military supremacy over civilian authority.

The reported abduction of political analyst Ronald Leonard Egesa from Radio One premises on 13 November raises equally serious concerns. The Uganda Law Society has demanded disclosure of his whereabouts. Responsibility remains to be established.

Meanwhile, the Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Bill, 2026, sponsored by Hon. Denis Namara and reportedly supported by PLU, proposes changes to the selection and removal of the Leader of the Opposition.

If enacted in its reported form, the Bill would effectively place the Leader of the Opposition’s tenure at the mercy of the ruling party’s parliamentary majority.

Parliament may legislate, but the separate constitutional concern is whether demands associated with the serving CDF are influencing civilian parliamentary leadership.

During our BBS discussion, Hon. James Kakooza, an NRM Member of Parliament, condemned these developments, warning that mounting public anger over PLU’s provocative activities could precipitate a national crisis.

His warning deserves consideration.

Military non-partisanship exists precisely to prevent the armed forces’ coercive authority from becoming an instrument of partisan competition.

The question is no longer confined to who might become President in 2031. It concerns the integrity of civilian government today.

THE PRESIDENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA

President Museveni occupies two positions central to this controversy.

As NRM National Chairman, he may initiate lawful discussions about future leadership. As Commander-in-Chief, he bears constitutional responsibility for an armed force required to remain non-partisan and subordinate to civilian authority.

His letter inviting CEC to consider his son’s future leadership raises questions about reconciling these responsibilities.

If Muhoozi’s politicking was unlawful when Baryomunsi condemned it in 2023, what has legally changed?

Has the General retired? Has Parliament amended the prohibitions?

Has a competent court interpreted the law differently? Has the Attorney General rendered a contrary legal opinion?

How can the Commander-in-Chief reconcile military subordination to civilian authority with reported threats by his serving CDF against the Vice President?

These questions deserve direct answers, not political rationalisations.

The Commander-in-Chief, military command, NRM leadership and law-enforcement institutions possess distinct constitutional responsibilities. None may suspend the law through political accommodation.

Selective enforcement undermines military discipline, civilian institutions and equality before the law.

CONCLUSION: A REPUBLIC, NOT A REGENCY

The regency metaphor exposes the contradiction.

In monarchies, succession may follow bloodline. In constitutional republics, political authority derives from law and democratic processes.

Muhoozi’s political minority is metaphorical. His military status presently prevents him from acquiring the NRM membership necessary for candidature.

CEC may contemplate his future eligibility. It cannot, however, lawfully transform political expectation into present qualification.

The lawful route remains available: retirement, acquisition of party membership and participation in nomination procedures alongside eligible competitors.

The NRM can prepare for 2031 without prejudging existing members’ rights. Meanwhile, institutions responsible for military discipline and civilian supremacy must discharge their obligations.

The immediate question is not who should become Uganda’s President in 2031.

It is whether Uganda’s Constitution and laws still govern the political conduct of those exercising power in 2026.

The writer is a senior advocate and former Ugandan Minister.

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